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Abstract
We examine the question of which household members should con-
sume medical services, and in what quantities, by using Japanese
household-level data. We employ two key concepts, health risk and
income risk, and investigate whether family heads or dependents bear
these risks. Health risk is the risk that a household member falls ill,
while income risk is the risk that future household income decreases.
We ﬁnd that both heads and dependents make fewer visits to doctors
as household size increases. We also ﬁnd that only dependents visited
doctors less frequently following the reform of the public health insur-
ance system, which raised the co-payment rate of family heads from
10% to 20%. These ﬁndings imply that heads and dependents share
health risk but dependents bear income risk.
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A primary concern for a household is the health of its members. However,
since household income is limited, the issue of which household members
should consume medical services, and in what quantities, is a serious one. In
this paper, we examine this issue by using Japanese household-level data.
All Japanese citizens are insured by the public health insurance system.
In particular, employees (hereafter referred to as heads) of large companies
and their dependents are insured by a health insurance association managed
by the company. In addition to premiums, the insured must pay some pro-
portion of their bills for medical services, termed the co-payment, over the
counter at clinics or hospitals. Before the reforms introduced in September
1997, the co-payment rate was set at 10% for heads and 30% for dependents.
The reform raised the co-payment rate for heads to 20%, while the rate for
dependents remained unchanged.
Table 1 shows who consumed medical services and in what quantities
before and after the reform. First, both heads and dependents made fewer
visits to doctors as the number of dependents increased, both before and
after the reform. Second, after the reform dependents reduced their number
of doctor visits by much more than did heads (see also ﬁgures 1 and 2). The
decline in the number of doctor visits by heads is negligible. We attempt to
explain these facts by making theoretical assumptions about the behavior of
household members.
The ﬁrst fact implies that both heads and dependents act to reduce the
risk of illness among other family members by reducing their consumption
of health services equally. In other words, households seem to pool the total
risk of illness among their members, hereafter referred to as health risk,b y
sharing health care expenditure among household members. If a household is
1formed solely so that household members can reduce living costs by sharing
a house, its contents and the car and the head is egoistic, we cannot explain
the ﬁrst fact. Since health services are private services, any reduction in
these services reduces individual health levels. When the head is benevolent
and altruistic towards dependents, as Becker (1974) assumed, both facts can
be explained. Becker’s model is sometimes referred to as a unitary model in
which the head, whether egoistic or altruistic, decides shares of expenditure
among household members and the household is regarded as an economic
unit in itself. Even if only heads earn income, the model may be restrictive
and unrealistic because housekeeping by spouses contributes to the work of
heads.
On the other hand, models in which households decide how to share
expenditure between members are referred to as collective models. A co-
operative bargaining model is one form of collective model. Manser and
Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) are seminal papers in the
context of the cooperative approach. Pezzin and Schone (1999) examined
how intergenerational households are formed when informal caregiving to an
elderly parent and labor-force participation by daughters are jointly deter-
mined. Chiappori (1988) and Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992) established
a rigorous theoretical and empirical framework for collective models to avoid
having to specify a particular bargaining set-up.
In our paper, the ﬁrst and second facts can be explained by assuming
that dependents have bargaining power over the head to some extent and
that they act egoistically. An increase in the number of dependents enhances
their bargaining power, which makes the head reduce his or her visits to the
doctor. This explains the ﬁrst fact, which relates to pooling health risk.I f
dependents decide their consumption levels independently and in their own
2interests, the change in the head’s co-payment rate would not aﬀect visits
to the doctor by dependents provided household income remains unchanged.
If a head is reluctant to visit a doctor because of the co-payment increase,
the head may fall ill, which may reduce future household income. Hence, we
refer hereafter to income risk. When the income risk is high, the bargaining
power of the head is high, in which case, dependents would share the risk
even if they were egoistic. This may explain the second fact. Dercon and
Krishnan (2000) adopted a collective approach to explain the intra-household
allocation of nutritional levels using the idea of risk sharing.
Let us summarize the above discussion brieﬂy. There are two axes, one
representing the decision-making process, unitary or collective, the other rep-
resenting behavioral motives, egoistic or altruistic. The unitary-egoistic case
cannot explain the two facts illustrated by table 1 and apparent in the ﬁgures.
The unitary-altruistic and collective-altruistic cases can explain these facts.
The predominant idea, altruism, can explain all possible types of behavior
by household members, however it fails to provide speciﬁc explanations for
these facts. Thus, we choose the collective-egoistic approach to explain the
facts using two key concepts, health risk and income risk. The purpose of this
paper is to examine whether the hypotheses of health risk and income risk
sharing are supported by the data by using statistical models that control
for household/individual characteristics.
We specify individual visits to the doctor (hereafter, doctor visits) by
the head and dependents as hurdle negative-binomial models (see chapter
4 of Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, and Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1996). This
model can deal with data generated from two potentially diﬀerent decision
processes. In the Japanese public health insurance system, a doctor may be
able to inﬂuence the number of doctor visits. Hence, specifying two decision
3processes, the decision of the insured and the combined decision of the insured
and a doctor, is reasonable. The former is modeled in the hurdle part by using
the logit model and the latter is modeled in the positive-visits part by the
truncated negative-binomial model (see Yoshida and Takagi, 2002, for an
application to Japanese data).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe characteristics
of the data used in the empirical analysis. In section 3, we present the
empirical models. In section 4, we interpret our estimation results from the
viewpoints of health risk and income risk sharing. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2T h e D a t a
We use data on bills (reseputo in Japanese) from medical institutions, hospi-
tals and clinics, to a health insurance association. When an insured person
visits a medical clinic at least once in a month, the clinic sends a reseputo to
the health insurance association for the medical cost incurred in that month
after the over-the-counter co-payment has been made. If a patient visits two
diﬀerent clinics in a month, the association receives two reseputos for that
patient. We use information from reseputos for outpatients.
The reseputo data include the monthly number of doctor visits and the
co-payment made over the counter by the insured. The data also include
a household-identiﬁcation number and the head’s income on which the in-
surance fee is levied, as well as socio-economic characteristics such as age,
gender, and household composition (covering spouse, children, grandparents
and relatives). Thus, we have information on who is in a particular insured
household and how many times a household member visits a doctor in a
month.
4Since we are concerned with intra-household resource allocation, we are
interested in the structure of households, which relates to who is the main in-
come earner and who are the dependents. There are three types of household.
The ﬁrst is one in which there are two parents, a husband and wife, with the
husband being the head in most cases, and dependents, namely a spouse,
children, grandparents or relatives. The second type is one in which both
parents are heads, that is, full-time workers, and there are dependents. The
third type is the household in which there is only one parent, with he or she
being the head, and there are dependents. Single-person households are ex-
cluded from our study. In our data, we cannot distinguish between the second
and third household types. In both, there is no dependent spouse. However,
intra-household resource allocation is diﬀerent in the two types because hus-
band and wife have similar bargaining power in the second household type.
Hence, for this type of household, income risk is not as important as it is
for the ﬁrst and third household types. Thus, for estimation, initially we use
the data on all three household types and then use the data on only the ﬁrst
household type (hereafter, type-1 households).
The reform was introduced in September 1997. To examine the eﬀects of
the reform, we aggregate monthly-based reseputo data to yearly-based data,
covering the pre-reform period from September 1996 to August 1997 and the
p o s t - r e f o r mp e r i o df r o mS e p t e m b e r1997 to August 1998. We aggregate at
both the individual and household levels.
Using data on all three household types, table 1 shows the average per-
capita number of doctor visits in both the pre-reform and post-reform periods
by household status, head or dependent, and by the number of dependents. In
the table, ‘0 included’ or ‘0 excluded’ indicates whether persons not visiting
a doctor are included or excluded. The number of insured persons in our
5data set is 17,026, of which 5,161 are heads and 11,865 are dependents. The
average household has one head and two dependents.
The data conﬁrm the two facts reported in the introduction. First, both
heads and dependents reduce doctor visits as the number of dependents in-
creases, in both pre- and post-reform periods. Second, the dependents re-
duced their doctor visits by more than did heads following the reform (see
table 1 and ﬁgures 1 and 2). The decline in doctor visits among heads was
negligible.
In the 0-excluded pre-reform case, the number of doctor visits by heads
fell from 13.71, with one dependent, to 9.30, with more than three depen-
dents, while those of dependents fell from 17.30 to 13.00. Similar falls were
experienced following the reform. Since heads with fewer dependents tend
to be younger and healthier, their number of doctor visits is expected to
be lower than the number of visits by heads with many dependents. How-
ever, table 1 contradicts this expectation. This implies that the head shares
the health risk of dependents. This is perhaps supported by the fact that
the number of doctor visits by dependents increased from 11.39, with three
dependents, to 13.00, with more than three dependents, in the pre-reform
period. The corresponding change for the post-reform period is from 10.57
to 12.05. These increases are understandable because large households tend
to include infants or elderly people as dependents who need intensive health
care, and whose risks are shared by the head.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate probability densities for the number of doc-
tor visits by heads and dependents, respectively. The pre-reform density for
h e a d sd o e sn o td i ﬀer from the post-reform density. However, the probability
density for dependents changes between these periods: the probability of a
large number of doctor visits falls, and that of a smaller number rises. This
6means that the dependents who visit a doctor regularly reduce the frequency
of their visits. Among all 0-excluded cases in table 1, heads reduced the
number of doctor visits by 0.24 following the reform, while dependents re-
duced their visits by 0.75. In particular, in households with more than three
dependents, dependents reduced their visits by 0.95, while heads increased
their visits by 0.02. These facts suggest that dependents reduce their medical
consumption so that heads can maintain their levels of medical expenditure
following increased co-payment rates for heads to avoid the income risk as-
sociated with illness among heads.
3 Empirical Models
Since the dependent variable, the number of doctor visits per year, takes
non-negative integer values, we use a count data model, the hurdle negative-
binomial (HNB) model. The model can be interpreted as a two-part model.
While the ﬁrst part models the probability that the zero hurdle is crossed,
the second part models the positive outcome. We use the logit model for
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where X1i represents the characteristics of the ith household and/or the
individual socio-economic characteristics of dependents.
The probability function of the negative-binomial model is used to model
the positive outcome. Note that two types of negative binomial (NB) model
a r eu s e di np r a c t i c e ,N B 1a n dN B 2 . T h ed i ﬀerence between them is the
functional form for the variance: in NB1, the variance is a linear function of
the mean, while in NB2, it is a quadratic function. We use the NB2 model.







where µ and α are the mean and the dispersion parameters of the distribution,
respectively. Then, the positive outcome is modeled as
Pr[Yi = y|Yi > 0] =
f(y|µi,α)
1 − f(0|µi,α)
The mean function, µi, is modeled as exp(X2iβ2)w h e r eX2i represents the
characteristics of the ith household and/or the individual socio-economic
characteristics of dependents. The likelihood function is decomposed into
two parts, as follows:
L1(β1)=Π(i:Yi=0)Pr[Yi =0 ] Π(i:Yi>0)(1 − Pr[YI =0 ] ) ,
and
L2(α,β2)=Π(i:Yi>0)Pr[Yi = y|Yi > 0],
where estimates of β1, α and β2 are obtained by maximizing L1(β1)a n d
L2(α,β2) separately.
As already discussed, the number of doctor visits of the head (dependent)
is aﬀected by the number of dependents because health risk is shared. Fol-
lowing the reform, heads may not have changed their number of doctor visits
but dependents may have because they share income risk.T h e s h a r i n g o f
income risk seems to take place primarily among dependents. We estimate
the numbers of visits by heads and dependents to examine who shares income
risk.
A list of the variables and their descriptive statistics for heads and depen-
dents is shown in table 2. The explanatory variables are classiﬁed into two
categories, individual-speciﬁc and household-speciﬁc explanatory variables.
8Since households have only one head in our data set, the characteristics of
heads are categorized as household-speciﬁc explanatory variables, and visits
by heads depend only on these variables. Dependents’ visits are explained
by the variables in both categories. The base case for dependents is that in
which gender is female, and household status corresponds to grandparents or
other relatives.
The co-payment rate is calculated by dividing over-the-counter fees by the
total medical fee according to the reseputo.N o t et h a tt h ec o - p a y m e n tr a t ei s
omitted in the hurdle part of the model because only its nominal rate, 10%
(20% following the reform) or 30%, is observed by the insured beforehand.
Then, the co-payment rate is indistinguishable from the constant term of
the model. In general, the actual rate diﬀers from the nominal rate because
ﬁnancial support is incorporated. Hence, the co-payment rate is identiﬁed in
the positive-outcome part of the model.
To examine the eﬀects of the reform, we include among the explanatory
variables post-reform variables, which are zero in the pre-reform period. We
constructed a post-reform dummy that is unity in the post-reform period and
zero otherwise. Then, post-reform variables were constructed by multiplying
the explanatory variables by this dummy. The coeﬃcients of the post-reform
variables represent the eﬀects of the variables following the reform. If the
coeﬃcients are statistically insigniﬁcant, the eﬀe c t so ft h ev a r i a b l e sa r en o
diﬀerent following the reform.
4 Estimation Results
4 . 1 R e s u l t sB a s e do nD a t af r o mA l lT h r e eH o u s e h o l d
Types
A. The Hurdle Part
9We use data on all household types in this subsection. Tables 3 and 4
report the estimation results of heads and dependents, respectively.
First, the hurdle-part estimation results for heads indicate whether heads
or dependents reluctant to visit doctors in order to share health risk.W h e t h e r
heads share health risk is indicated by the coeﬃcients of no. of depen-
dents.T h i s c o e ﬃcient is signiﬁcantly negative, which implies that heads
share health risk in their decisions to visit a doctor.
We have already explained that, given the properties of the data set,
risk-sharing behavior of type-1 households is likely to diﬀerent from that of
other-types households. In a type-1 household, insured-spouse dummy takes
a value of unity, but otherwise is zero. The estimate of the coeﬃcient is not
signiﬁcant, which implies that there is no diﬀerence between heads of type-1
and other-types households in relation to sharing health risk.
Age of dependents is an important factor for health risk because infants
and the elderly often fall ill. The coeﬃcient of no. of dependents over 69 is
signiﬁcantly negative, while that of no. of dependents under 9 is signiﬁcantly
positive. Since medical expenditure for infants is supported by local govern-
ments and because childhood illnesses are not generally serious or costly,
this expenditure may not aﬀect the number of doctor visits by heads. How-
ever, since illness among the elderly is often chronic and costly, the head who
shares health risk must consider this when deciding whether to visit a doctor.
We also used sum of dependents’ doctor visits and no. of dependents
visiting a doctor as explanatory variables to control for household-speciﬁc
eﬀects such as peer eﬀects of a household or accessibility to clinics. All of
the members of a household tend to consume more medical services given
household-level income than did other households. This is because house-
holds have similar propensities to consume services as a result of learning
10about the costs and the beneﬁts of these services from each other. These
eﬀects are regarded as peer eﬀects. We have no information on accessibility
to clinics among households in our data, but access cost is likely to aﬀect
a household’s number of doctor visits. Thus, the signs of the coeﬃcients of
these variables are expected to be positive.
The coeﬃcient of age of head is signiﬁcantly positive and that of monthly
income is signiﬁcantly negative. The head tends to visit the doctor because
he or she is older. The head’s income may be a proxy for the opportunity
cost of visiting a doctor. Alternatively, the result shows that the rich are
healthier.
Second, we examine the hurdle part for dependents in table 4. Among
household-speciﬁc variables, the coeﬃcients of no. of dependents over 69, no.
of children and no. of dependents are signiﬁcantly negative, which suggest
that dependents are reluctant to visit a doctor if there is an elderly dependent
person, many children or many dependents in the household. This implies
t h a td e p e n d e n t s ,a sw e l la sh e a d s ,a l s os h a r ehealth risk.
The coeﬃcients of age of head and monthly income are signiﬁcantly pos-
itive. Income aﬀects visits by dependents diﬀerently to visits by heads.
This may reﬂect the lower opportunity cost of dependents. The coeﬃcients
of head’s visits and no. of dependents visiting a doctor, which represent
household-speciﬁce ﬀects, are insigniﬁcantly positive and signiﬁcantly posi-
tive, respectively.
Next, we examine how individual characteristics aﬀect decisions to visit
the doctor. The coeﬃcients of age, gender dummy (male=1), spouse dummy
and child dummy are all signiﬁcantly negative. Adults and females are re-
luctant to visit a doctor. Spouses and children visit doctors less than do
grandparents or other relatives. Only over-69 dummy is signiﬁcantly posi-
11tive.
Note that none of the post-reform variables for heads or dependents is sig-
niﬁcant. This implies that neither heads nor dependents behaved diﬀerently
following the reform in relation to visiting a doctor.
B. The Positive-Visits Part
Here, we examine the positive-visits part of the model.
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimation results for heads and dependents,
respectively. In table 3, for the pre-reform period, almost half of the explana-
tory variables for the doctor visits by heads are signiﬁcant. The variables
that are signiﬁcant at the 5% level are the constant term, age of head, sum
of dependents’ visits, no. of dependents and co-payment rate.H o w e v e r ,f o r
the post-reform period, only co-payment rate is signiﬁcant. Older heads visit
doctors more frequently. The more often dependents visit a doctor, the more
heads visit. This represents household-speciﬁce ﬀects such as peer eﬀects
or the accessibility to clinics. Monthly income is signiﬁcantly negative at
the 10% level, as in the hurdle part. Common results to both hurdle and
positive-visits parts of the model suggest that heads with higher incomes are
healthy, because they spend more on preventative health goods/services or
because their opportunity costs are high.
The negative co-payment rate indicates that heads whose medical ex-
penditure is ﬁnancially supported visit a doctor more frequently. Although
the coeﬃcient of the post-reform co-payment rate is positive, the overall ef-
fect, -0.053+0.043, is negative. Doctor visits by heads are less elastic with
respect to co-payment rate than before the reform. The eﬀects of the co-
payment rate on heads’ visits changes from -0.53 (=-0.053x10%) to -0.20
(=(-0.053+0.043)x20%). Hence, the change in the co-payment rate did not
12have a negative eﬀect on the doctor visits by heads in general.
Since no. of dependents is signiﬁcant, heads share health risk with de-
pendents when deciding how many times to visit a doctor. This is the same
as the head’s decision about whether he or she should visit a doctor, which
is obtained from the hurdle-part of the model. These ﬁndings suggest that
dependents have some bargaining power over heads’ visits.
The estimates of the positive-visits part of the model for dependents are
reported in table 4. For the household-speciﬁc pre-reform variables, the coef-
ﬁcients of no. of children and no. of dependents, which are related to health
risk sharing behavior, are signiﬁcantly negative. The no. of dependents over
69 is signiﬁcant at almost the 10% signiﬁcance level. These results imply
that dependents share health risk among themselves. Monthly income is also
signiﬁcantly negative. This negative sign, together with its positive sign in
the hurdle part, suggests that the dependents of a wealthy household are
not reluctant to visit a doctor immediately on feeling ill, and thus they soon
recover. The coeﬃcients of the household-speciﬁce ﬀects variables, head’s
visit and no. of dependents visiting a doctor,a r es i g n i ﬁcantly positive, as
expected.
For individual-speciﬁc pre-reform variables, age, spouse dummy, child
dummy and co-payment rate are signiﬁcantly negative, while gender dummy
(male =1) is signiﬁcantly positive. The over-69 dummy is not signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients of age and over-69 dummy imply that doctor visits of de-
pendents decrease slowly with age. Males tend to visit doctors more than
females, and both spouses and children visit less than grandparents or other
relatives. Note that since females and grandparents or other relatives are
the base case for estimation, the constant term may also reﬂect the eﬀects of
aging.
13For the post-reform variables, the signiﬁcant variables are the constant
term, no. of dependents visiting a doctor and co-payment rate,w h i c ha r ea l l
negative. Of the individual-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e sspouse dummy is negative at
almost the 10% signiﬁcance level. The negative signs of the constant and
spouse dummy suggest that dependents share income risk.
C. Tests
We also conducted likelihood ratio (LR) tests for the HNB models for both
heads and dependents, with the null hypothesis being that the coeﬃcients of
the post-reform variables are jointly zero. The results are reported in table
7. The null is rejected in the dependents model but not in the heads model.
T h ei s s u eo fw h e t h e rh e a d so rd e p e n d e n t ss h a r eincome risk,a ss u g g e s t e d
by the coeﬃcients of the constant term (for both heads and dependents),
spouse dummy and child dummy (for dependents only) for the post-reform
variables, should be examined more closely. We have already found that the
coeﬃcient of the constant term for heads in the positive-visits part of the
model is not signiﬁcant. By contrast, the coeﬃcients of the constant term,
spouse dummy and child dummy for dependents are signiﬁcantly negative.
However, these ﬁndings are not suﬃcient to suggest that only dependents
share income risk or that dependents at least share income risk more than
do heads. To make this case, we must consider the standard errors of the
estimates.
Changes in the number of doctor visits made by heads due to income
risk are represented by the estimates of the constant term. For dependents’
visits, spouses’ changes are represented by the estimates of the constant term
+ spouse dummy. Changes for children’s visits are represented by the con-
stant term + child dummy. Changes for grandparents or other relatives are
14represented by the constant term + over-69 dummy. We advance three null
hypotheses. We tested whether changes for heads and dependents are signif-
icantly diﬀerent. The test statistics, Z,a r ec a l c u l a t e da sf o l l o w s :
Z =






The results are reported in table 7. The null hypothesis that changes in
doctor visits for heads and dependents are no diﬀerent is rejected for heads
against spouses and for heads against c h i l d r e nb u tn o tf o rh e a d sa g a i n s t
grandparents or other relatives (abbreviated over-69 in the table). Since
most of those over-69 are grandparents, only dependents other than grand-
parents share income risk,o rd e p e n d e n t sa tl e a s ts h a r eincome risk more
than do heads.
4.2 Type-1 Household Data
We use type-1 household data for estimation. These households have two
parents, a husband and wife, with the husband being the head in most cases,
and dependents, namely a spouse, children, and grandparents or relatives.
The results are almost the same as those of the model using data on all
household types, and the models have larger pseudo R-squared values. Note
that insured-spouse dummy for the household-speciﬁc variables is omitted
because all households of this type have insured spouses.
Tables 5 and 6 show the estimation results for heads and dependents.
Table 5 indicates that heads share health risk.T h e m a i n d i ﬀerence be-
tween the results for heads from type-1 households and those for heads from
data on all household types is that monthly income is not signiﬁcant in the
former but is signiﬁcantly negative in the latter.
Table 6 clearly shows that dependents share health risk and income risk.
15Since the estimates of the pre-reform variables are the same as those obtained
from the data on all household types, we focus on the post-reform variables.
In the hurdle part, the constant term is signiﬁcantly negative, which im-
p l i e st h a td e p e n d e n t ss h a r eincome risk as well as health risk when deciding
whether to visit a doctor. Although spouse dummy is signiﬁcantly positive,
the total eﬀect, which is given by constant term + spouse dummy,r e m a i n s
negative, so the positive sign does not change the results. In the positive-
visits part of the model, the main diﬀerence between the type-1 results and
the all-types results is that the constant term is insigniﬁcant, child dummy
is signiﬁcant, and the spouse dummy is signiﬁcant at almost the 10% level.
This implies that dependents share income risk.
Table 7 also shows that the same results are obtained when using type-1
data or all-types data. The LR-test results suggest that heads did not change
their behavior but that dependents did. The Z-test results also suggest that
spouses and children share income risk.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examined the question of which household members should
consume medical services, and in what quantities, by using Japanese household-
level data. We used two key concepts, health risk and income risk,a n di n -
vestigated whether heads or dependents share these risks. Health risk is the
risk that a household member falls ill, while the income risk is the risk that
future household income decreases. We found that both family heads and
dependents visit doctors less often as household size increases, and that only
dependents visited a doctor less frequently following the reform of the public
health insurance system, which raised the co-payment rate for heads from
10% to 20%. These ﬁndings imply that both heads and dependents share
16health risk but only dependents share the income risk.
These diﬀerences in risk sharing between heads and dependents can be
explained by collective models. Dependents have some bargaining power over
heads since they manage housework and support employed heads. Hence,
heads share health risk to maintain eﬃciency at work. However, reduced
doctor visits by heads due to the increased co-payment rate may reduce
future household income. Thus, dependents reduced their doctor visits so
that the number of doctor visits by heads could remain unchanged following
the reform.
Although most of the ﬁndings of this paper can be explained by egois-
tic motives in a collective framework, the exception is the ﬁnding that the
elderly share neither health risk nor income risk. This may be because the
elderly are wealthy. However, since wealthy elderly people are not classiﬁed
as dependents by the public health insurance system, this cannot be the ex-
planation. Therefore, what is the explanation? The altruism of family heads
or younger dependents may provide an explanation, but this remains to be
examined empirically.
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18Table 1: Changes in per capita number of doctor visits by the number of dependants
Pre-reform Post-reform
No. Head Dependant Total Head Dependant Total
dependants 0 incl 0 excl 0 incl 0 excl 0 incl 0 excl 0 incl 0 excl 0 incl 0 excl 0 incl 0 excl
1
No. obs. 1497 1138 1497 1238 2994 2376 1497 1144 1497 1238 2994 2382
No. visits 10.43 13.71 14.31 17.30 12.37 15.58 10.27 13.44 14.18 17.15 12.22 15.37
2
No. obs. 1398 1099 2796 2315 4194 3414 1398 1075 2796 2291 4194 3366
No. visits 9.15 11.64 11.71 14.15 10.86 13.34 8.84 11.50 10.95 13.37 10.25 12.77
3
No. obs. 1612 1208 4836 4035 6448 5243 1612 1194 4836 3991 6448 5185
No. visits 7.58 10.12 9.50 11.39 9.02 11.09 7.15 9.66 8.72 10.57 8.33 10.36
more than 3
No. obs. 654 510 2736 2306 3390 2816 654 490 2736 2285 3390 2775
No. visits 7.25 9.30 10.95 13.00 10.24 12.33 6.98 9.32 10.07 12.05 9.47 11.57
Total
No. obs. 5161 3955 11865 9894 17026 13849 5161 3903 11865 9805 17026 13708
No. visits 8.79 11.47 10.96 13.15 10.30 12.67 8.49 11.23 10.25 12.40 9.71 12.07
†The”0 excluded” is the case where the observations of ”0 visit” is excluded from our data
19Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Pre-reform Post-reform
Variable name Mean s.d. 25% 75% Mean s.d. 25% 75%
Explained variables
Doctor visit
Head(No.of obs.=5161) 8.79 14.22 1 12 8.49 14.09 1 12
Dependant(No.of obs.=11865) 10.96 20.17 1 13 10.25 19.49 1 12
Individual-speciﬁc explanatory variables for dependants(No.of obs.=11865)
Age 29.28 20.19 14 45 30.28 20.19 15 46
Over-69 dummy 0.04 0.19 0 0 0.04 0.19 0 0
Gender dummy (male=1) 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1
Status in household relationship
Spouse dummy 0.38 0.48 0 1 0.38 0.48 0 1
Child dummy 0.56 0.50 0 1 0.56 0.50 0 1
Co-payment rate 26.94 6.80 27.75 30 29.05 6.61 30 31.54
Household-speciﬁc explanatory variables(No.of obs.=5161)
Household-speciﬁce ﬀects
Head’s visits 8.79 14.22 1 12 8.49 14.09 1 12
Sum of dependants’ visits 25.20 34.56 6 32 23.55 32.87 5 30
Monthly income of head (100,000Yen) 5.90 1.36 5.05 6.53 6.05 1.37 5.30 6.78
Age of head 47.40 7.61 43 54 48.40 7.61 44 55
Age of dependants
No. of dependants under 9 0.30 0.62 0 0 0.25 0.56 0 0
No. of dependants 60-69 0.03 0.17 0 0 0.03 0.17 0 0
No. of dependants over 69 0.12 0.35 0 0 0.12 0.36 0 0
Insured-spouse dummy † 0.87 0.34 1 1 0.87 0.34 1 1
No. of children 1.29 1.01 0 2 1.29 1.01 0 2
No. of dependants 2.30 1.07 1 3 2.30 1.07 1 3
No. of dependants visiting doctor 1.92 1.10 1 3 1.90 1.09 1 3
Head’s co-payment rate 9.39 1.98 10 10 20.38 4.87 20.09 22.25
†This dummy takes one if the spouse in a household is a dependant, otherwise zero.
††The s.d. is an abbreviation of standanrd deviation.
20Table 3: Estimates of Head’s Model (All-types Households Data)
Pre-reform variables The eﬀect of reform
Parameter Estimate s.e. P-value Estimate s.e. P-value
HURDLE PART
Constant 0.501 0.286 0.080 -0.168 0.402 0.676
Household-speciﬁe variables
Age of head 0.020 0.007 0.003 -0.003 0.009 0.767
Age of dependants
No. of dependants under 9 0.120 0.069 0.082 -0.066 0.100 0.506
No. of dependants 60-69 0.338 0.219 0.123 -0.054 0.313 0.864
No. of dependants over 69 -0.202 0.116 0.082 0.213 0.166 0.200
Insured-spouse dummy 0.000 0.105 0.999 0.045 0.148 0.760
No. of dependants -0.231 0.054 0.000 -0.019 0.076 0.799
Monthly income of head (100,000Yen) -0.061 0.034 0.070 0.050 0.047 0.289
Household-speciﬁce ﬀects
Sum of dependants’ visits 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.495
No. of dependants visiting doctor 0.264 0.052 0.000 -0.040 0.074 0.590
Pseudo-R2 0.105
POSITIVE-VISITS PART
Constant 0.988 0.186 0.000 -0.331 0.258 0.200
Household-speciﬁc variables
Age of head 0.042 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.724
Age of dependants
No. of dependants under 9 -0.004 0.036 0.919 0.023 0.052 0.656
No. of dependants 60-69 0.048 0.145 0.741 0.022 0.204 0.913
No. of dependants over 69 -0.109 0.072 0.129 0.012 0.099 0.908
Insured-spouse dummy -0.067 0.062 0.281 -0.089 0.086 0.302
No. of dependants -0.125 0.037 0.001 0.009 0.052 0.858
Monthly income of head (100,000Yen) -0.033 0.020 0.093 -0.013 0.027 0.635
Household-speciﬁce ﬀects
Sum of dependants’ visits 0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.317
No. of dependants visiting doctor 0.046 0.039 0.231 0.020 0.052 0.697
Head’s co-payment rate -0.053 0.008 0.000 0.043 0.008 0.000
Dispersion parameter
α 1.874 0.060 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.203
†The s.e. is an abbreviation of standanrd error.
21Table 4: Estimates of Dependant’s Model (All-types Households Data)
Pre-reform variables The eﬀect of reform
Parameter Estimate s.e. P-value Estimate s.e. P-value
HURDLE PART
Constant 3.343 0.556 0.000 -0.715 0.807 0.376
Household-speciﬁc variables
Age of head 0.021 0.010 0.040 -0.007 0.014 0.643
Age of dependants
No. of dependants over 69 -0.770 0.150 0.000 0.091 0.216 0.672
No. of children -0.371 0.123 0.003 0.096 0.178 0.590
No. of dependants -2.071 0.126 0.000 -0.047 0.185 0.799
Monthly income of head (100,000Yen) 0.063 0.036 0.076 -0.032 0.048 0.504
Household-speciﬁce ﬀects
Head’s visits 0.002 0.003 0.525 0.000 0.004 0.945
No. of dependants visiting doctor 3.142 0.068 0.000 -0.013 0.096 0.890
Individual-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
Age -0.042 0.009 0.000 0.015 0.013 0.234
Over-69 dummy 2.451 0.438 0.000 -0.074 0.638 0.907
Gender dummy(male=1) -0.344 0.0870 0.000 -0.029 0.121 0.813
Status in household relationship
Spouse dummy -1.443 0.383 0.000 0.527 0.568 0.354
Child dummy -1.803 0.523 0.001 0.9544 0.766 0.213
Pseudo-R2 0.569
POSITIVE-VISITS PART
Constant 5.703 0.195 0.000 -0.618 0.267 0.021
Household-speciﬁc variables
Age of head 0.005 0.003 0.117 0.003 0.005 0.522
Age of dependants
No. of dependants over 69 -0.087 0.054 0.107 -0.069 0.075 0.356
No. of children -0.269 0.044 0.000 -0.055 0.062 0.375
No. of dependants -0.102 0.045 0.024 0.089 0.063 0.155
Monthly income of head (100,000Yen) -0.022 0.011 0.051 -0.004 0.016 0.780
Household-speciﬁce ﬀects
Head’s visits 0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.944
No. of dependants visiting doctor 0.263 0.022 0.000 -0.066 0.029 0.021
Individual-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
Age -0.019 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.790
Over-69 dummy 0.019 0.155 0.903 0.292 0.207 0.157
Gender dummy(male=1) 0.076 0.032 0.019 0.021 0.045 0.645
Status in household relationship
Spouse dummy -0.756 0.139 0.000 -0.306 0.188 0.104
Child dummy -1.407 0.193 0.000 -0.414 0.271 0.127
Co-payment rate -0.073 0.003 0.000 0.033 0.004 0.000
Dispersion parameter
α 1.372 0.023 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.333
†The s.e. is an abbreviation of standanrd error.
22Table 5: Estimates of Head’s Model (Type-1 Households)
Pre-reform variables The eﬀect of reform
Parameter Estimate s.e. P-value Estimate s.e. P-value
HURDLE PART
Constant 0.402 0.314 0.201 -0.047 0.441 0.915
Household-speciﬁc variables
Age of head 0.021 0.007 0.004 -0.006 0.010 0.562
Age of dependants
No. of dependants under 9 0.092 0.072 0.202 -0.043 0.105 0.681
No. of dependants 60-69 0.251 0.271 0.354 -0.121 0.375 0.748
No. of dependants over 69 -0.233 0.138 0.090 0.279 0.198 0.159
No. of dependants -0.240 0.057 0.000 -0.005 0.080 0.953
Monthly income of head (100,000Yen) -0.054 0.036 0.135 0.065 0.050 0.199
Household-speciﬁce ﬀects
Sum of dependants’ visits 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.409
No. of dependants visiting doctor 0.274 0.055 0.000 -0.080 0.078 0.308
Pseudo-R2 0.115
POSITIVE-VISITS PART
Constant 0.807 0.203 0.000 -0.391 0.281 0.164
Household-speciﬁc variables
Age of head 0.040 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.646
Age of dependants
No. of dependants under 9 -0.001 0.036 0.971 0.045 0.052 0.392
No. of dependants 60-69 0.038 0.165 0.819 0.021 0.250 0.933
No. of dependants over 69 -0.119 0.088 0.181 -0.042 0.123 0.735
No. of children
No. of dependants -0.122 0.038 0.001 0.020 0.053 0.704
Monthly income of head (100,000Yen) -0.020 0.020 0.307 -0.012 0.028 0.666
Household-speciﬁce ﬀects
Sum of dependants’ visits 0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.531
No. of dependants visiting doctor 0.046 0.039 0.247 0.002 0.054 0.974
Head’s co-payment rate -0.037 0.008 0.000 0.031 0.008 0.000
Dispersion parameter
α 1.765 0.060 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.273
†The s.e. is an abbreviation of standanrd error.
23Table 6: Estimates of Dependant’s Model (Type-1 Households)
Pre-reform variables The eﬀect of reform
Parameter Estimate s.e. P-value Estimate s.e. P-value
HURDLE PART
Constant 6.470 0.849 0.000 -2.093 1.234 0.090
Household-speciﬁc variables
Age of head 0.025 0.011 0.026 -0.012 0.015 0.431
Age of dependants
No. of dependants over 69 0.326 0.270 0.228 -0.342 0.406 0.400
No. of children 0.660 0.246 0.007 -0.309 0.376 0.412
No. of dependants -3.045 0.251 0.000 0.348 0.384 0.365
Monthly income of head (100,000Yen) 0.052 0.037 0.166 -0.026 0.050 0.603
Household-speciﬁce ﬀects
Head’s visits 0.003 0.003 0.427 -0.001 0.004 0.782
No. of dependants visiting doctor 3.035 0.069 0.000 -0.010 0.098 0.922
Individual-speciﬁc variables
Age -0.046 0.010 0.000 0.021 0.014 0.124
Over-69 dummy 0.953 0.617 0.123 0.628 0.889 0.480
Gender dummy(male=1) -0.387 0.094 0.000 -0.027 0.130 0.835
Status in household relationship
Spouse dummy -3.445 0.575 0.000 1.475 0.841 0.079
Child dummy -3.864 0.692 0.000 2.066 1.006 0.040
Pseudo-R2 0.735
POSITIVE-VISITS PART
Constant 5.669 0.296 0.000 -0.432 0.413 0.295
Household-speciﬁc variables
Age of head 0.007 0.003 0.030 0.004 0.005 0.354
Age of dependants
No. of dependants over 69 0.038 0.100 0.701 -0.032 0.141 0.819
No. of children -0.157 0.092 0.088 0.002 0.131 0.986
No. of dependants -0.212 0.094 0.023 0.038 0.133 0.778
Monthly income of head (100,000Yen) -0.020 0.012 0.095 -0.016 0.016 0.343
Household-speciﬁce ﬀects
Head’s visits 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.712
No. of dependants visiting doctor 0.260 0.022 0.000 -0.070 0.030 0.022
Individual-speciﬁc variables
Age -0.019 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.856
Over-69 dummy 0.026 0.214 0.905 0.151 0.296 0.610
Gender (male=1) 0.081 0.035 0.021 0.007 0.048 0.886
Family-relation dummy
Spouse of head -0.739 0.200 0.000 -0.454 0.279 0.103
Child of head -1.371 0.241 0.000 -0.562 0.341 0.099
Co-payment rate -0.073 0.003 0.000 0.034 0.004 0.000
Dispersion parameter
α 1.370 0.025 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.340
†The s.e. is an abbreviation of standanrd error.
24Table 7: The Results of Tests
LR test Zt e s t
Head Dependant Head vs. Spouse Head vs. Child Head vs. Over-69
Household type Statistics d.f. Statistics d.f. Statistics Statistics Statistics
All types 27.68 21 130.66 27 80.26 216.80 -1.43
(0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.92)
Type 1 16.74 19 121.30 27 129.22 155.51 -26.92
(0.61) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
† T h ePv a l u e sa r es h o w ni np a r e n t h e s e s .
†† The d.f. is an abbreviation of degrees of freedom.
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